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I develop a growth model where output can be produced with a modern and a traditional
technology. The traditional technology has a lower TFP and a lower share of reproducible
capital than the modern technology. In this simple framework, barriers to capital accumu-
lation aﬀect the extent to which these technologies are used. Intuitively, barriers reduce
the return to using the modern technology relative to the traditional technology because
reproducible capital is a more important input in the modern technology. As a result, bar-
riers to capital accumulation not only aﬀect the capital to output ratio in the economy but
also aggregate TFP. The theory thus connects two seemingly disparate research programs
in the recent growth literature: models of factor accumulation and models of total factor
productivity. The model economy is calibrated by interpreting the traditional technology as
producing agricultural output and the non-reproducible factor as land. The theory implies
that barriers to capital accumulation are associated with large agricultural shares. This novel
implication of the theory is strongly supported by both cross-country data and time series
evidence from a set of East Asian miracle countries. For a reasonable parameterization of
the model, the required TFP diﬀerences needed to account for a reasonable disparity in the
wealth of nations are reduced by a half relative to the standard growth model that abstracts
from technology choice.
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11 Introduction
I introduce technology choice in an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model with bar-
riers to capital accumulation and show that it substantially ampliﬁes the role of barriers in
accounting for international income diﬀerences. The environment consists of a single good
and two technologies, modern and traditional, that require capital and labor inputs. These
technologies diﬀer in total factor productivity and the share of reproducible capital. Barriers
lower the return to factor allocation in the modern technology. Therefore, an implication of
the theory is that barriers increase the share of resources allocated to the traditional technol-
ogy and this allocation, in turn, generates lower aggregate TFP endogenously. I show that
relative to the standard neoclassical growth model, the exogenous TFP diﬀerences required
in this model to generate a reasonable disparity in the wealth of nations are reduced by a
half for reasonable levels of barriers.
Standard neoclassical growth theory cannot account for the great disparity in the
wealth of nations. Important extensions to the standard theory to include broader notions
of capital such as schooling capital (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992), technological capital
(Parente and Prescott, 1994), and human/organizational capital (Chari, Kehoe, and Mc-
Grattan, 1996); require either implausibly large schooling investments or large barriers and
investment of unmeasured capital. Subsequent theories of total factor productivity (TFP),
such as Parente and Prescott (1999), have neglected the potential role of barriers to capital
accumulation in generating aggregate TFP diﬀerences across countries. The theory I propose
in this paper nests these two seemingly disparate approaches in accounting for the wealth of
nations.
In standard growth models, international income diﬀerences are entirely due to dif-
ferences in capital to output ratios, while in this model, income diﬀerences are ampliﬁed
through the allocation of factor inputs to less eﬃcient technologies. There is substantial
evidence supporting this implication of the theory.
2 Economic Environment
2.1 Technologies and Main Implications
At each date, there is a single good that can be produced according to two technologies,













2where Ki is the input of reproducible capital services and Ni is the input of labor services
in technology i 2 (a;m), L is the input of non-reproducible capital services, and both
technologies exhibit labor-augmenting productivity growth (°;´ > 1). Notice that the output
elasticity of capital and labor are the same across technologies consistent with the ﬁndings
in Gollin (2002). In the analysis that follows, I interpret traditional output as agriculture
and the non-repoducible factor in the traditional technology as land. Capital accumulation
follows




where Xt is gross investment and ¼ is a technology parameter that determines the rate
at which output goods are transformed into capital. In the next section, I consider the
relative price of investment as a measure of barriers ¼. Following the lead of Parente and
Prescott (1994) this modiﬁcation of the capital accumulation equation has become standard
in cross-country income level analysis.
The following simple example illustrates the main implications of the model. Suppose
there are two countries: country i allocates all labor to the modern technology and country
















Equation (1) illustrates the mechanisms of relative income diﬀerences implied by barriers
to capital accumulation across countries in this model. The ﬁrst component consists of
the standard tradeoﬀ between consumption and saving summarized by diﬀerences in capital
to output ratios. The second term corresponds to diﬀerences in the reproducible-capital
intensity across technologies1. The third term consists of total factor productivity diﬀerences
between the modern and traditional technologies.
The choice of technology in each country is extreme and arbitrary in this example, the
intensity to which each technology is used in production is an endogenous outcome of the
model. In the next subsection, I explicitly derive the conditions to factor allocation in each
technology and show how in equilibrium these allocations are related with barriers to capital
accumulation. The main ﬁnding is that barriers generate a misallocation of factor inputs
to the less eﬃcient technology, generating a negative eﬀect in aggregate TFP. The factor
allocation implication of the theory is strongly supported by cross-country and time series
evidence.
1Notice that if the share of non-reproducible capital (1 ¡ Ã) is small, then this factor would not be
important quantitatively. Moreover, if the capital to output ratio in country j is below one, as it is the case
in many poor countries, then the second term in this equation would imply lower income diﬀerences between
the two countries.
32.2 Population and Equilibrium
I assume a representative (stand-in) inﬁnitely-lived household with preferences over con-





where ¯ is the time discount factor and the per-period utility of per-capita consumption is
weighted by the household size Nt. Households are endowed with one unit of productive
time each period, K0 units of the capital stock at date 0, and L units of land. Households
can allocate time to either sector. I assume exogenous and constant population growth, with
the initial population size normalized to one
Nt+1 = ÁNt; Á > 1:
An equilibrium in this economy consists of a sequence of allocations fKm;t;Ka;t;Nm;t;
Na;t;Kt+1;Ctg1
t=0, prices fwt;rtg1
t=0, and land rents fΠtg1
t=0 such that: (i) given prices and
land rents, allocations solve the household’s problem, (ii) factor prices are competitive, and
(iii) markets clear at each date: output Ct + Xt = Yt, capital Kt = Ka;t + Km;t, and labor
Nt = Na;t+Nm;t. A balanced growth path equilibrium is an equilibrium as deﬁned above with
the property that (Ka;Km;K;C;Π) are growing at the rate °Á, (Na;Nm;N) are growing at
the rate Á, w is growing at the rate °, and r is constant.
I focus on the cross-country implications of the model and therefore abstract from
sectoral reallocation within a country over time. I assume that productivity growth diﬀers
across the modern and traditional technologies so that labor shares across sectors remain
constant in the balanced growth path2. To illustrate the properties of the model in a simpli-
ﬁed fashion, I transform all growing variables by dividing for exogenous growth. Abstracting











where all inputs are divided by °tNt, ni = Ni=N is the employment share in sector i 2 fa;mg,
A = A
1¡®
0 L(1¡Ã)®, and B = B
1¡®
0 .
Finding an equilibrium in this model is simple. Factor mobility implies that wage and












The return to capital is determined by the euler equation from households, that in turn










The capital to labor ratio in the modern sector in equation (5) depends on the same funda-
mental objects as in the standard theory. In particular, equation (5) and (4) illustrate that
high barriers imply low capital to labor ratios. The capital to labor ratio in the modern
sector determines the wage in this sector (see equation 3). Wage equalization across sectors














From the employment shares and the capital to labor ratios across sectors, all other quantities
can be readily obtained. Notice in equation (6) that barriers to capital accumulation aﬀect
the allocation of labor across sectors. The reason is that barriers aﬀect the capital to labor
ratio in the modern sector, diminishing the return of working in that sector. This triggers a
movement of labor away from the modern sector that equalizes sectoral wages in equilibrium.
Manipulating equations (2), (3), and (4), it is straightforward to show that aggregate







a na + B(1 ¡ na)
i
: (7)
Equation (7) illustrates that aggregate income depends on: (a) the capital to labor ratio
in the modern sector that in turn is aﬀected by barriers (see equation 5) and (b) aggregate
TFP, which is a weighted average of sectoral TFP. This can be easily seen by letting Ã ¼ 1
and noting that the term in brackets becomes Ana + B(1 ¡ na), that is, aggregate TFP is
roughly an average of sectoral TFP weighted by the employment share in each sector. A key
result of the theory is the link between the employment share of the traditional sector na and
barriers to capital accumulation ¼ (see equation 6). Although there is abundant evidence of
diﬀerences in technology use across countries, these diﬀerences may not all be related with
barriers to capital accumulation, other factors such as unions and institutional regulations
may be important. In this paper I explore a channel connecting factor accumulation and
5aggregate TFP that has been neglected by two important strands in the literature: one
emphasizing the role of distortions to capital accumulation (such as Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil, 1992 and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 1996) and another one emphasizing the role
of barriers to technology adoption (such as Parente and Prescott, 1999, 2000; and Prescott,
1998).
2.3 Calibration
I assume that the benchmark economy faces no barriers ¼ = 1 and calibrate this economy to
U.S. data. The emphasis in this paper is on technology use applied to cross-country income
diﬀerences, but could well be applied to labor productivity diﬀerences in agriculture and
other sectors. However, technology use is diﬃcult to measure in the data. To the extent
that some sectors tend to systematically produce with less eﬃcient technologies, such as
agriculture in developing countries, I use the agricultural sector to impose restrictions on the
parameters pertaining to the traditional technology. Another reason to use agriculture to
restrict the traditional technology is that land is a natural candidate for the non-reproducible
capital input featured in this technology.
There are 8 parameters to calibrate: ¯, °, Á, ±, A, B, ®, Ã. The growth of modern
technology TFP ° and the growth rate of population Á are chosen to match long-run post-
war U.S. productivity and working-age population growth. The capital income share in
the U.S. economy determines ®. The physical capital depreciation rate ± and the time
discount factor ¯ are chosen to match the investment to output ratio and capital to output
ratio. The income elasticity of non-reproducible capital (1 ¡ Ã)® is reported in estimations
of agricultural production functions, such as in Hayami and Ruttan (1985) and Mundlak
(2001). The estimated values range between 0.1 and 0.4. I choose 0.1 as a benchmark. To
the extent that high (1¡Ã)® values imply low reproducible capital intensity in the traditional
technology and low income levels in countries with a large traditional sector, using the low-
end estimate is a conservative strategy for a study of relative income diﬀerences with barriers
to capital accumulation. TFP in the modern sector B is chosen to generate a normalized
aggregate income of 1 in the benchmark economy and TFP in the traditional sector A is
chosen to match the employment share of agriculture3. Table 1 reports a summary of these
parameter values and targets.
3Recall that the units of A include land.
6Table 1: Calibration of Benchmark Economy
Parameter Value Target
° 1.02 growth rate of aggregate productivity 1.02
Á 1.019 growth rate of working age population 1.019
® 0.35 capital income share 0.35
Ã 0.71 income elasticity of land 0.1
± 0.04 investment to output ratio 0.2
¯ 0.94 capital to output ratio 2.5
B 0.72 normalization of aggregate output 1
A 0.58 employment share in agriculture 0.02
2.4 Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences
I consider a world of closed economies that are identical in all respects except on barriers to
capital accumulation ¼. I emphasize that, unlike Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996), barriers only aﬀect the accumulation of physical capital since
I abstract from human capital and other forms of intangible capital. In this dimension,
my analysis also diﬀers from Parente and Prescott (1994) since they consider barriers to
technology adoption, that is essentially a barrier to unmeasured capital.
Table 2 documents the implications of the model regarding aggregate income, the share
of employment in the traditional sector, and the capital to output ratio for diﬀerent levels
of barriers. To be consistent with the way the data is reported in Summers and Heston
(1991), I use the output price of the benchmark economy to compute aggregate income in all
other economies4. The empirical counterpart of barriers in the data is the relative price of
investment. The evidence suggests that reasonable factor diﬀerences in the relative price of
investment across countries lies between 4 and 6 (see Jones, 1994 and Restuccia and Urrutia,
2001). The results in Table 2 indicate that aggregate income of the distorted economy with
barriers of 4 is 41% of the benchmark economy5. In addition, the share of employment in
the traditional technology is 17% and the capital to output ratio is 4 times smaller than in
the benchmark economy.
Two implications of the results are worth emphasizing. First, aggregate income diﬀer-
4Actually, in Summers and Heston (1991) an international price (geometric average) is constructed, but
the results are similar using the U.S. price, ¼ = 1. The price adjustment of an economy with a barrier of 4
implies that aggregate international income is roughly 85% of the domestic measured income.
5This result is robust with respect to the value of the capital land share (1 ¡ Ã). I ﬁnd that the capital
land share has no impact on the labor allocation na as long as the traditional TFP parameter A is calibrated
to match a ﬁx target. It has a small impact on aggregate income, roughly given by the second term in
equation (1). However, the capital land share has an important impact on capital/output diﬀerences across
countries, in particular, small values of Ã generate implausibly large diﬀerences in capital to output ratios.
7Table 2: Cross-Country Income Diﬀerences
¼ y(B.E. price) na K=Y
1 1.00 0.02 2.53
2 0.62 0.06 1.25
4 0.41 0.17 0.61
6 0.32 0.32 0.39
10 0.25 0.69 0.21
12 0.22 0.92 0.16
ences across countries are larger than in a model with one technology. Roughly speaking,
a standard one-sector growth model with similar capital share implies that a country with
a barrier of 4 has an aggregate income of 0.5. Therefore, allowing for technology choice
substantially ampliﬁes the role of barriers on income diﬀerences across countries. Second,
the model generates small shares of labor allocated to the traditional technology. In the
data, as Figure 1 illustrates, the share of agriculture in the labor force is as high as 90% in
poor countries, roughly 45 times the agricultural labor allocation in rich countries. Therefore
income (and aggregate TFP) diﬀerences would be larger if labor allocations implied by the
model were closer to the data.
A way of improving the implications of the model in terms of employment shares
and making the quantitative implications of the model readily comparable with alternative
models is to relax the extreme assumption that all countries are using the same technolo-
gies (although in diﬀerent proportions). There are important productivity diﬀerences across
countries (for instance see the evidence in Hayami and Ruttan (1970) for agricultural pro-
ductivity, Prescott (1998) for other industries, and Hall and Jones (1998) for the aggregate
economy). In the following experiment I ask: what are the exogenous aggregate TFP dif-
ferences required in order to reproduce a given income diﬀerence across countries? For this
purpose, I consider a slight modiﬁcation of the technologies in (2) and (3) to allow for exoge-
nous aggregate TFP diﬀerences across countries, by multiplying them by a factor µ 2 (0;1].
For a given country I ask, what is the µ required to generate a factor income diﬀerence of
10 with respect to the benchmark economy for diﬀerent levels of barriers. The results of
these computations are presented in Table 3 where the ﬁrst row documents the benchmark
economy.
The results are striking. First, for an economy with barriers of 4, the exogenous TFP
diﬀerences required to match a factor income of 10 is 0.4. In the standard growth model,
the required exogenous TFP diﬀerences to generate the same factor income is 0.2. That
is, the model with technology choice reduces the requirement on TFP diﬀerences by half.
8Table 3: Exogenous TFP Diﬀerences
¼ y(B.E. price) µ na
1 1.0 1.00 0.02
1 0.1 0.23 0.19
2 0.1 0.31 0.35
4 0.1 0.40 0.69
6 0.1 0.46 1.00
Exogenous factor diﬀerences in TFP of 2.5 is within the reasonable range argued by the
evidence in Prescott (1998). Second, the model implies shares of traditional employment
that are much closer to the agricultural shares in the data. For an economy with barriers
of 4, the traditional employment share is much larger than the one implied by the model
without exogenous TFP diﬀerences (69% and 17% respectively). Notice, however, that this
result occurs even though the relative TFP across sectors has not changed.
A paper that is similar in spirit to mine is Parente, Rogerson, and Wright (2000). They
introduce household production into the standard growth model. The household production
model implies that barriers to capital accumulation produce a reallocation of hours of work
from market activities to home activities. This substitution produces large amounts of un-
measured output in the distorted economy that accounts for all income diﬀerences (above and
beyond the eﬀect of barriers on capital accumulation in the standard growth model). That
is, diﬀerences in total output and welfare, although still substantial, are equal or even smaller
than in the neoclassical growth model. The theory proposed here implies no unmeasured
output or investment. The main distinction of the results is that my model generates TFP
diﬀerences endogenously. Without unmeasured output or investment my model is capable
of generating similar income diﬀerences as in Parente, Rogerson and Wright (2000).
3 Some Evidence
The main implication of the model is that barriers determine the allocation of labor across
technologies and hence aggregate income. This prediction of the model is strongly supported
by cross-country data. Figure 1 documents a strong negative correlation between the share
of agriculture in the labor force and relative income, while Figure 2 reports a strong positive
correlation between the share of agriculture in the labor force and the relative price of
investment as a measure of barriers in a cross-section of countries for 1985.
An implication of the model is that countries that reallocate capital and labor away
from the traditional sector relative to the benchmark would catch-up in terms of steady
9state relative income levels. To check this implication of the model in the data, I look at
the behavior of a set of miracle countries. Figure 3 reports the growth experience of a set
of countries. Japan is an example of remarkable growth performance. Relative to the per-
worker GDP of the U.S., Japan went from 1/6 to 2/3 of the U.S. from 1950 to 1990. As a
measure of barriers in Japan, the relative price of investment went from 1.7 of the U.S. in
1960 to roughly 1 in 1985. This 70% fall in relative barriers is associated with an increase in
the relative investment rate that almost doubled the U.S. level during the period. However,
the key implication is whether the agricultural employment share fell. Indeed, Japan went
from an agricultural share of 62% in 1950 to less than 10% in 1990 (reducing by half the
factor diﬀerence in this statistic with respect to the U.S.).
Taiwan and Korea are also miracle countries and the same qualitative pattern described
above for Japan holds for these countries. Following the example in Lucas (1993), I check that
the Philippines conforms a diﬀerent pattern than Korea during this period. This is indeed
the case. Barriers stayed relatively high during the period, and the agricultural labor force
share fell faster in the U.S. than in the Philippines, with Philippines still presenting more
than 50% of the labor force in agriculture in 1990. Young (1995) documents the importance
of rising labor force participation and intersectoral allocation of labor (from agriculture to
manufacturing) in accounting for the growth performance in East Asian economies. Young
also points to the rising levels of education and investment rates as important factors. An
interpretation of Young’s results is that, accounting for rising participation rates, intersec-
toral transfers of labor, and capital investments, the TFP growth rates needed to account for
these growth miracles is much smaller. Young’s results strongly support the implications of
my model. Relative to Young’s analysis, my theory oﬀers an explanation for the movement
of labor away from traditional activities in miracle economies.
Another piece of evidence comes from plant dynamics in U.S. manufacturing. Baily,
Hulten, and Campbell (1992) document the sources of aggregate productivity growth in the
U.S. manufacturing sector. They ﬁnd that around half of the overall productivity growth
is accounted for by shifts in employment from less productive plants to more productive
plants. To the extent that labor allocation is crucial in accounting for productivity growth
in a country with almost no distortions, country distortions in the allocation of resources
to the most productive technologies may account for a sizable portion of labor productivity
across countries. An interpretation of the exercise pursued in this paper is as a study of
the role of labor allocation across technologies in accounting for income diﬀerences across
countries.
104 Discussion
The available evidence suggest that labor allocation to the most productive technologies
can account for an important portion of income diﬀerences across countries. I study this
proposition in an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model with technology choice. The
model substantially ampliﬁes the role of barriers in accounting for income diﬀerences across
countries.
Extending the analysis to consider other forms of capital (see an earlier version of
this paper in Restuccia (2001) for an extension with human capital) would improve the
predictions of the model in two important dimensions. First, it would reduce the exogenous
TFP diﬀerences needed to generate a given income ratio (as in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil,
1992; Parente and Prescott, 1994; and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 1996). Second, as long
as the modern technology is more intensive in this additional capital than the traditional
technology, barriers would generate larger labor allocation diﬀerences across countries. As
an example and starting from the benchmark economy, I calculate the diﬀerence in modern
TFP needed to generate reasonable labor allocation diﬀerences across countries for a given
level of barriers. For a country with barriers of 4, a 10% lower TFP in the modern sector
is enough to generate a traditional employment share of almost 90% (compared to 17% for
the same economy in the constant-B model). This eﬀect further increases income diﬀerences
from 0.41 in the constant-B model to 0.34.
The model can also be extended to study the transition of an economy to modern
growth and the role of transitory income in accounting for current income diﬀerences across
countries as proposed by Lucas (2000). Hansen and Prescott (1999) develop such an environ-
ment and Ngai (2000) uses their framework with barriers to capital accumulation to assess
Lucas’ proposition quantitatively. My model can be extended to embed Ngai’s formulation,
by allowing a third technology, similar to the traditional but with high initial TFP and
slower TFP growth. In this extension, the model would feature a Malthusian period and
a transition to modern growth where traditional technologies are used to a larger extent in
poor countries (high barriers) relative to rich countries (low barriers). This characterization
of modern growth is what distinguishes my analysis from Hansen and Prescott (1999) and
Ngai (2000). Provided there are no large changes in barriers/policies, the cross-country in-
come distribution at the end of the 21st century would provide a test of whether the income
distribution converges to the one implied by the standard neoclassical model as suggested by
Lucas (2000) and implied by the model in Ngai (2000) or to one that features larger steady
state income diﬀerences as implied by my model.
This paper also relates to models of technology adoption that study income and growth
diﬀerences across countries. Parente and Prescott (1994) study technology adoption as a form
of capital, but in their formulation income diﬀerences steam from barriers to technology
11adoption directly, something that is diﬃcult to measure in the data. Moreover, the theory
requires large amounts of unmeasured investments. Nelson and Phelps (1966) consider a
model of technology adoption with human capital requirements. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)
implement this model empirically and ﬁnd support in the data. Diﬀerently than these two
papers, I focus on income levels and on technology choice in production. Aggregate total
factor productivity steam in their models from the adoption of more eﬃcient technologies,
while in my set up these aggregate technology diﬀerences steam from the allocation of labor
to ineﬃcient technologies.
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14Figure 1: Labor Force in Agriculture and Per-Worker GDP 1985






















































































































15Figure 2: Labor Force in Agriculture and Relative Prices 1985




















































































































16Figure 3: Country Experiences over Time
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